Tornevall Networks

Enligt Expressen har 25 V-kandidater till höstens val hyllat terror och spridit hat och antisemitism. Men det är en tunn soppa som den ökänt antipalestinska journalisten Inas Hamdan kokat ihop. 

Bara några få av kandidaterna har delat inlägg som faktiskt kan anses vara antisemitism. De flesta av de uthängda V-kandidaterna har istället på olika sätt hyllat det palestinska motståndet – något som inte borde vara kontroversiellt för den som, likt FN, erkänner ett ockuperat folks rätt att med vapen i hand bekämpa en ockupationsmakt. En har delat ett inlägg av Kommunistiska Partiet där 7 oktober – helt korrekt – beskrivs som en ”motattack mot förtryck och ockupation”.

Det som skaver mest är hyckleriet och de dubbla måttstockarna. Medan etablerad media letar fram Palestinaaktivisters gamla inlägg som kan sägas sprida konspirationsteorier, ignorerar man fullständigt det hat och den rena rasism som flödar bland Israelfanatikerna och SD-trollen.

Av de 25 kandidaterna Expressen hängt ut är det nio som spridit inlägg som på något sätt pekas ut som antisemitiska. Men att Expressen anser att något är antisemitiskt betyder inte att det är det.

Två av kandidaterna har delat inlägg som hävdar att israeliska judar härstammar från khazarerna, ett folk som ska ha konverterat till judendomen på 700-talet. Det må vara såväl irrelevant som historielöst, men knappast antisemitiskt i sig.

Jämför detta med ett av de vanligaste angreppen mot palestinier, både från svenska högertroll och israeliska regeringsföreträdare: att palestinier som folk överhuvudtaget inte existerar. Vad är mest rasistiskt?

Ytterligare två kandidater har delat inlägg om att judar kontrollerar media och den amerikanska staten, eller att Israel styr USA. Det är påståenden som är felaktiga och kan gränsa till antisemitiska konspirationsteorier. Samtidigt är det välkänt att det finns en stark proisraelisk lobby i USA. Att peka på Israels och proisraeliska organisationers inflytande över regeringar och media i västvärlden är knappast antisemitism.

Jämför förresten detta med hur SD-toppar som Jimmie Åkesson och Rickard kan hävda att muslimer är det största hotet mot Sverige, och att det pågår en medveten ”islamisering” av Europa.

Av de fem ”antisemitiska” kandidater som kvarstår, har två på olika sätt ifrågasatt antalet döda i Förintelsen, två har delat inlägg med koranverser om att judarna (egentligen ”Israels barn”) kommer att ”fördärva jorden”, och en har delat ett inlägg med ett Marx-citat om judar – taget helt ur sitt sammanhang.

Olämpliga delningar som antyder antisemitiska tankegångar och konspirationsteorier, absolut.

Men knappast bevis för att hat och antisemitism skulle flöda bland vänsterpartister eller palestinska aktivister.

Allt osar av hyckleri. Gång på gång väljer etablerad media att granska offren och de som engagerar sig mot folkmord, istället för att granska förövarna och de som stödjer folkmord.

Den som loggat in på X eller Facebook och observerat ett kommentarsfält under en artikel om Palestina eller Palestinaaktivister vet också hur det ser ut. Här flödar rasism och hat på ett helt annat sätt än vad det någonsin gjort bland Palestinaaktivister.

Förra sommaren avslöjade Proletären hur gruppmedlemmar i ”Svenskar som stödjer Israel” beskrev invandrare i allmänhet och palestinier i synnerhet som ”odjur”, ”avskräde” och ”barbarer”. 99 svenska politiker, varav flera riksdagspolitiker, var medlemmar i gruppen. 

Bara de senaste veckorna har vi på Proletären tvingats radera hundratals inlägg i våra kanaler som hyllar våld mot Palestinaaktivister eller uttryckt hat och rasism mot palestinier.

Det är här hatet och rasismen i det svenska samhället finns. Inte bland svensk-palestinier som vill se sitt hemland befriat.

Lisa Röstlund och Daniel Wiklander utanför studion. Foto: Hanna Lundquist

I Aftonbladets granskning Volontärerna avslöjar reportern Lisa Röstlund en rad tveksamheter kring stiftelsen Fållöknastiftelsen och statsministerparets inblandning i den.

Volontärer bjuds in för att arbeta gratis med renovering på stiftelsens gård i Sörmland, mot löfte om att ingå i ett värdefullt nätverk – underförstått inbegripet statsministern.

I slutet av maj kunde Lisa Röstlund själv wallraffa som volontär under fingerat namn – och kom till och med in i statsministerns privata bostad på gården. I Daniel Wiklanders intervju berättar Röstlund bland annat om hur hon reagerade när Säpo släppte förbi henne in i Kristerssons omedelbara närhet.

Inas Hamdan och Hanna Lundquist i studion. Foto: Axel Andén.

Expressens grävande reporter Inas Hamdans avslöjade att 25 kandidater inom Vänsterpartiet bland annat hyllat terrorklassade grupper och diktatorer har lett till att samtliga personer nu petats från partiets vallistor.

I intervjun med Veckans gräv berättar Inas Hamdan bland annat om bakgrunden till granskningen, om reaktionerna från de granskade, och hur Vänsterpartiet konsekvent vägrat ställa upp på intervju med henne och Expressen.

Fler gräv som nämns i podden:

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Veckans gräv finns ute nu, där poddar finns.

Hon går till val på samma politik, samhällsanalys och problemformulering som Sverigedemokraterna. Den enda uttalade skillnaden att det som lett partiet dit inte är rasismen – utan ”förnuftet”.

När Sverige, Danmark, Norge och Finland går emot Rysslands intressen eller håller demokratiska val så försöker pro-ryska ”hacktivister” störa och förstora i länderna – NORDIS har följt hackarnas aktiviteter.

Illustration: Nathalie Damgaard Frisch/TjekDet

I ett samarbete med TjekDet, Faktabaari och Faktisk har vi undersökt hur pro-ryska hackare agerar i de nordiska länderna. Genomgången är på engelska.

At a press conference last year the former Danish Minister of Defence, Troels Lund Poulsen, announced that Russia has been found responsible for “destructive and disruptive cyberattacks against Denmark”.

From the Danish public service channel DR.

The destructive attack took place in 2024 against a Danish waterworks facility, where hackers gained access to the control system and increased the water pressure. This caused several water pipes to burst and left residents without water.The disruptive attacks were DDoS-attacks targeting Danish websites ahead of the 2025 municipal and regional elections, temporarily preventing access to the sites.The attacks were carried out by the hacker groups Z-Pentest Alliance and NoName057(16), which, according to the Danish intelligence service, have links to the Russian state.

We are neither in a state of war nor in a state of peace, the Danish Minister of Defence concluded at the press conference in November 2025. The attacks are part of Russia’s hybrid war against the West.The two hacker groups are far from the only ones carrying out such attacks. The Nordic Observatory for Digital Media and Information Disorder, NORDIS, a collaboration of Nordic fact-checkers and researchers, has followed more than 20 pro-Russian groups on Telegram in recent months, where the hackers mockingly publicise their attacks. In the latest years they have targeted Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden.

The situation in the Nordics

In 2026 alone, Denmark has been attacked 247 times, according to the hacker groups NORDIS has been following. That is by far the highest number among the Nordic countries, although not all of the attacks have been successful.The vast majority are DDoS-attacks against websites (distributed denial-of-service attack), which can make the sites inaccessible for a period of time. However, there are also a number of examples where hackers have successfully gained access to various surveillance cameras and subsequently shared images and videos from them on Telegram, as well as attempts to manipulate technology.

From reporting of the Danish fact-checker TjekDet.

According to the The Danish Resilience Agency’s threat assessment, the hackers often target websites belonging to authorities and companies involved in critical infrastructure. NORDIS’ investigation shows the same pattern.In Norway April 2025 unauthorized individuals gained digital access to a dam facility for a fish hatchery by Risevatnet in Bremanger.According to the National Criminal Investigation Service, Kripos, a special unit in the Norwegian police focused organized and serious crimes, the hackers had access to the control panel from 12:57 PM to 4:49 PM. During these four hours, the perpetrators increased the water inflow in the facility, causing the valves to release nearly 500 liters of water per second before the attack was discovered and halted.The leak reportedly had no consequences, as the dam is estimated to handle around 20,000 liters of water per second.

From the Norwegian magazine Energiteknikk.

In October, the police security agency PST in Norway concluded the investigation with Kripos and stated that pro-Russian hackers were behind the attack. The case was then closed and no one was charged.In June 2025, a three minute video showing the cyber break-in was posted to a Telegram channel belonging to the pro-Russian hacker group Z-Pentest Alliance, where the alliance claimed responsibility. PST has concluded that this is the group behind the attack.

From Telegram.

The channel has now been removed from Telegram, and a new one has emerged with the same name. The Norwegian NORDIS partner Faktisk has screenshots of the video and the messages published in the aftermath of the attack. The video shows a control panel where numbers are being altered by the hackers.

Attacks to disrupt elections

Pro-Russian hackers have also published posts claiming to have carried out a number of DDoS-attacks against several Norwegian websites. One such attack occurred when Høyre’s, the Conservative Party, website was knocked offline just six days before the 2025 Norwegian parliamentary election.Researchers mapping foreign influence in connection with the parliamentary election believe the hacker group’s intent ”was to make themselves interesting and relevant within hacktivist communities and to the Russian authorities.”Andreas Skjøld-Lorange, specialist director at Norway’s agency for national protective security NSM, believes the attacks are not necessarily an attempt to influence the election results themselves, but rather an easy opportunity to create division and distrust.”Even though something might feel specifically targeted toward an election, it may just be an opportunity to amplify efforts that they actually have a very long-term horizon on,” Skjøld-Lorange tells Faktisk.He does not think it is a coincidence that the hackers have chosen to shift their focus away from Norway and over to other countries, such as Denmark, which held elections in March of this year.The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has concluded that the hackers’ activities did not have any significant impact on the 2025 parliamentary and Sámi parliament elections in Norway.

From the Norwegian newspaper VG.

In Sweden authorities have seen a clear development since 2023 – cyber attacks haven’t necessarily increased in number but in their level of sophistication. The attackers have changed focus from IT-attacks, with limited effects outside the internet, to OT-attacks (”Operational Technology”) striking critical infrastructure.”Earlier non-state actors have been very focused on DDoS-attacks, ransomware and such. Now we see that they have expanded to some more advanced operations”, says Ola Billger, head of communication for The National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA), the Swedish national authority for Signals Intelligence and home to the National Cyber Security Centre NCSC since 2024.Some attacks seem to have secondary objectives as well.

On the eve of the election day 2018 in Sweden, when the vote count had just started, the site of the Swedish Election Authority crashed. Afterwards there were unfounded rumors that the election results had been manipulated during the period when the site was down.

From the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter.

After closer examination the Election Authority concluded that a DDoS-attack had been directed at the site.In the next Swedish election 2022 there were three such attacks against the site of the Election Authority, raising suspicions that the goal was to fan new rumors of election manipulation.

Ahead of the upcoming election in September 2026 the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) warns of foreign interference in the electoral process – and that Russia in this regard is of the ”highest priority” for them.

DDoS-attacks and data breaches in Finland

In Finland the group NoName057(16) has carried out repeated series of DDoS-attacks in recent years, targeting, for example, the Tax Administration, ministries, banks, the City of Helsinki, and the Bank of Finland’s websites.

From Telegram.

When Finland joined NATO in April 2023, the group succeeded in taking down the Parliament’s website for a day. At the same time, it also disrupted the websites of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Prime Minister Sanna Marin, among others.In April 2025, during the municipal and regional elections, NoName launched denial-of-service attacks against the websites of election-related actors and took down the Center Party’s website. In early 2026, the group announced on its Telegram channel that it had carried out several dozen attacks against Finland, but its activity has since subsided.

Stealing sensitive information

In April 2026, the Finnish Security Police, Supo, and the National Cyber Security Center reported that they had thwarted a Russian military intelligence operation in Finland. A “Russian threat actor group” dubbed APT 28, had hijacked several dozen poorly secured home routers and other internet-connected devices as part of a cyberespionage operation.The hackers had set up a network in which all devices communicated with one another. The Russians’ intention was to use the hijacked home routers to hide their own activities.

Press release of the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, Supo.

At the same time, they had the opportunity to steal sensitive information from intercepted communications if those messages happened to come from, for example, a government official or a company representative who was working on a home computer.The operation was halted when experts from the Cyber Security Center contacted the Finnish owners of the outdated routers and advised them on how to update or replace them.“This was a telling example of how both cybercrime and state-sponsored espionage operate today by using vulnerabilities in home routers,” says Samuli Könönen, an information security expert at the Cyber Security Center.

Unsubstantiated claims

Overall, DDoS-attacks by pro-Russian activists have not caused significant harm to Finns. Samuli Könönen estimates that for Russian hacker groups, gaining visibility for their pro-Russian messages and their anti-Ukraine and anti-Western activities is more important than technical achievements.“This is evident, for example, in the fact that when they promote their activities on Telegram, it is just the tip of the iceberg of what they are trying to do,” says Könönen.

From Telegram.

Internationally, cybersecurity authorities are closely monitoring the command-and-control traffic of Noname’s denial-of-service attacks. Every day, the group sends a list of IP addresses to be attacked to devices connected to the network. There are far more targets than successful attacks.“On Telegram, they only publish a list of those targets to which they can at least falsely attach images of successful attacks. Typically, the group retrieves a screenshot of a ‘404’ error from the page, which indicates that the requested page was not found,” Könönen notes.Sometimes, Könönen says, the reason for the error message may just as well be that the site has restricted access from abroad and continues to function well from within Finland.According to Könönen, similar exaggerations can be seen in reports of data breaches and, for example, in the hijacking of surveillance cameras, which Russian hackers have claimed credit for.According to Faktabaari’s own investigation, some of the surveillance camera footage published by the hacker group Morningstar had already been intentionally made publicly available online. Könönen confirms this finding.

Funded by Kremlin

Hacktivism has grown significantly as a phenomenon since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022, says Samuli Könönen. In the early stages of the war, many people in countries supporting Ukraine felt a desire to strike back at Russia.

”The IT Army of Ukraine” was established in Ukraine, coordinating its activities via Telegram and Twitter. It invited volunteer hackers from around the world who support Ukraine to join. They began carrying out denial-of-service attacks and data breaches against Russia. At the end of February 2022, the group reported that it had taken down, for example, the websites of the Moscow Stock Exchange and Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank.

“Pro-Russian hacker groups like NoName emerged as a reaction to that,” says Könönen.

There are indications that the Russian government was involved in the founding of both NoName and Z-Pentest and has provided financial support to the groups since then. And there are indications that the Kremlin is pleased with their efforts. Russia has supported both NoName and Z-Pentest with, among other things, financial resources.The Center for Research and Monitoring of Youth Online Behavior, established in 2018 on the orders of Vladimir Putin, serves as a front organization for the hackers.According to the American cyber defense agency CISA, Russia is likely responsible for supporting the creation of the groups ”The People’s Cyber Army of Russia” (CARR) and NoName057(16). The Z-Pentest Alliance emerged in 2024, composed of members from both of these groups.According to CISA, the center’s employees coded DDoSia, the software used by NoName for cyberattacks, funded the hacktivists’ network infrastructure, managed the hacktivists’ Telegram channels, and compiled lists of suitable targets.CARR, or “Cyber Army of Russia Reborn,” is, according to CISA, a creation of Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. Between 2022 and 2024, the group utilized resources provided by GRU’s unit 74455. The Z-Pentest Alliance was founded in 2024 and consists of members from both of these groups.

From Telegram 22 April.

It is also the assessment of Rasmus Larsen, Director of Operational Intelligence at the Danish cybersecurity company CSIS Security Group, that the groups are broadly recognised by Russia.

“By all appearances, these groups originate from people based in Russia or in some of the states closely linked to Russia. So it is difficult to imagine that this is taking place without the tacit acceptance of the Russian authorities at an absolute minimum,” he assesses.

Attempts to stop the groups

The numbers of hacktivists participating in ideologically motivated DDoS-attacks are high and they operate from numerous countries, which makes the networks hard for the authorities to counter.Last year, an Ukrainian national, Victoria Eduardovna Dubranova, 33, was extradited to the United States and faced charges for alleged involvement with both CARR’s and NoName’s illegal activities.

In July 2025, Europol announced it had disrupted NoName’s infrastructure together with Eurojust by dismantling “a major part of the group’s central server infrastructure and more than 100 systems across the world”. Europol also made two arrests and added five Russian individuals to its “Most Wanted” list as part of the “Operation Eastwood”.“The operation brought NoName’s activities to a complete halt for a few weeks in the summer of 2025”, says Samuli Könönen.“Since then, operations have continued more or less as before. At the end of the summer of 2025, they were even slightly more intense for a while, as the targets included several entities that had participated in Eastwood.”

Beyond that, information about the many pro-Russian hacktivist groups is limited.

They are, however, keen to read about their own attacks in Western media. This may be linked to achieving their objective of “disruption”. Very few people in the Nordic countries follow their Telegram channels, just as most people probably do not notice when a website is occasionally unavailable for a short period.

“They pay very close attention to when and who writes about them, and what is being written. They are also very noisy on their online channels. Look at us, listen to us,” says Rasmus Larsen.

An example of their desire for exposure became particularly clear in January, when the Danish NORDIS partner TjekDet had already published several articles about the many attacks.

Attack against NORDIS partner

On 31 January, TjekDet’s chair of the board tries to access the website of the Danish outlet TjekDet.dk. Instead of being met with the latest fact-checks, she receives a message saying that the website is unavailable.

She contacts TjekDet’s editor-in-chief, who has long feared an attack from the groups exactly because the outlet itself has written about them. He is also unable to access the site.

Meanwhile, an email has arrived in the inbox. The sender is the hacker group Inteid.

“Hello, I am the owner of the hacker group Inteid. Today I carried out a DDoS-attack against your website www.tjekdet.dk,” it says.

The sender also explains what they demand in order not to attack TjekDet again. It is not about money, but about visibility.

“If you do not publish an article about my attack on your website, I will attack your website again in the near future. You must also forward this information to other media websites so that they too publish an article about my hacker attack on your website. You still have time,” it says.

Inteid posting on Telegram.

In addition, they demand that TjekDet report the group to the police, because they would like to be declared wanted by the authorities.

Meanwhile, the editor-in-chief is in contact with Peytz, the company responsible for TjekDet’s website, which can report that the website is experiencing an extraordinarily high level of traffic.

For several hours, the website is unstable, alternating between being available and unavailable.

“There is a massive network behind the DDoS-attack,” Peytz says in an update to TjekDet’s editor-in-chief. “It is difficult to block them, but everyone is doing everything they can.”

Later that evening, Peytz succeeds in mitigating the attack. TjekDet did not comply with Inteid’s demands.

Boastful and immature

This craving for attention and, at times, somewhat immature communication involving bragging and random claims that they have access to confidential state documents which they will publish – but never do – is one of the reasons why Rasmus Larsen at the Danish cybersecurity company CSIS Security Group does not consider the actual threat from them to be particularly high.“Typically, the people who are truly capable are the ones you never hear from. They are not busy showing off. They are busy doing things that actually work and can cause harm. Those are the people we are concerned about.”He explains that they operate with three levels of threats, and hacktivists like some of those discussed in this article are on the third and lowest level.

From a post on Telegram 9 February 2026.

“These activist groups appear much looser and nowhere near the same level as what we see from the other groups,” says Rasmus Larsen.Nor does he believe that the hacktivists possess capabilities that they are simply choosing not to display at the moment because we are not, after all, in an actual war with Russia.“But that does not mean they could not be provided with those capabilities if it were ever to come to that,” he says.

Revenge for support of Ukraine

According to the 2025 annual report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the Nordic countries were not among the top five most targeted countries for cyberattacks in 2025. Noname directed the most denial-of-service attacks at the large EU member states – Germany, France, Italy, and Poland – as well as Lithuania among the Baltic countries.There are, as shown by this review, however still groups targeting the Nordics, and recently especially Denmark.

Rasmus Dahlberg, Associate Professor at Centre for Societal Security and Resilience at Roskilde University, has a theory as to why Denmark is the hardest-hit country in the Nordic region. He is deputy director of the research centre Centre for Societal Security and Resilience (SECURE) at Roskilde University.

“One obvious hypothesis is that it is because Denmark’s government has been very vocal in its support for Ukraine. We have not hidden the fact that we are a major donor country with strong public support for Ukraine in the war against Russia,” he says.

From the British newspaper The Independent.

The pro-Russian hacker groups have also pointed to support for Ukraine on several occasions as a reason for the attacks. On 28 January, Russian Legion, an alliance formed by several different groups, wrote on its Telegram channel:

“The Danish government plans to provide a military aid package worth 1.5 billion dollars. We consider this to be direct participation in the conflict and financing of the war against our interests. Denmark has 48 hours to publicly and officially reject the transfer of these funds. The refusal must be clear, unconditional and voiced at the level of the country’s leadership”.

From Telegram 16 February.

The Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency (MCF) has concluded that the number of attacks is closely connected to Sweden’s position in the geopolitical landscape. When something unusual happens things can escalate quickly – as for example when Sweden joined the military alliance NATO in March 2024. According to the IT security company Cloudflare the number of denial-of-service attacks went up by 466 percent.

Other times when Sweden has caught the ire of the hackers has been in connection to the support for Ukraine. In February 2026 the Swedish NORDIS partner Källkritikbyrån exposed pro-Russian groups hacking into surveillance cameras in Sweden.

Images: Telegram

Images from the cameras were posted in an open Telegram channel the same day as Sweden had announced a new support package for Ukraine with millions for health and social care. The purpose? To scare and exact a ”tax” for activities that displease the hackers or their employers, according to experts Källkritikbyrån spoke to.When NORDIS investigates Telegram channels belonging to these and similar hacker groups it’s clear that a string of pro-Russian groups has claimed to have performed attacks in connection to similar events. On 24 November 2025 Sweden hosted the Crimea Platform, a yearly summit to gather support for Ukraine and opposition against the Russian occupation of the Crimean Peninsula.In the days leading up to the summit one of the groups NORDIS has been monitoring published reports of attacks against 28 Swedish targets, among them political parties such as Miljöpartiet, Centerpartiet and several city- and municipality sites.

Wants visibility

Ola Billger at The National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) underscores that although the authorities take these reports seriously, you should also be wary. The group’s openness may originate from their desire for attention, which can lead to more job offerings and better pay.”So, sometimes these groups actually take responsibility for acts that they haven’t committed. That’s a reason why we are careful to comment on who is behind an attack sometimes. We don’t want to draw unnecessary attention to groups that live for exactly that kind of thing.”

This is echoed in Norway as well. During the Norwegian political festival Arendalsuka in the summer of 2025, PST chief Beate Gangås stated that the purpose of such operations is likely to contribute to broader influence, in addition to creating fear and unrest among a country’s population.

After the news about the cyber attack against the dam in Norway became publicly known in August, a YouTube-video and news articles about the attack were also shared in the Telegram channels. In these posts, the hacker alliance itself wrote that their goal ”is not to cause damage, but to demonstrate our readiness to defend the interests of Russia and to act decisively if necessary.”

Warfare in the cognitive domain

Although the consequences of DDoS-attacks specifically are usually minimal – a website that cannot be accessed, typically for a short period – Rasmus Dahlberg at Roskilde University believes they can be quite effective in the type of warfare taking place in the so-called cognitive domain. This is also the domain that is targeted when a foreign state attempts to spread disinformation.Rasmus Dahlberg describes Russia’s tactic as “death by 1,000 cuts”.“That is the hallmark of hybrid warfare. We are not being subjected to a large digital version of Pearl Harbor. It is a whole series of small attacks that, over time, can potentially undermine trust, spread concern and thereby erode the cohesion of our society,” he says, pointing out that there is reason to be concerned that DDoS-attacks, for example, may expose authorities’ inability to prevent this type of attack.

From Telegram 23 March.

According to Rasmus Dahlberg, it is difficult to tell how well Denmark is technically protected against cyberattacks. Nor is that necessarily the most important issue, he believes, because in reality this is not a battle being fought in cyberspace, but in all of our minds. Or, in the language of researchers: the cognitive domain.That is why the authorities must be good at preventing the secondary effects of a DDoS-attack, for example. This requires, among other things, that authorities are transparent and provide broad information, so that they do not leave the public worried.“I am not entirely convinced that we are strong enough at that yet. And that was a polite way of putting it,” he says.

The investigation is a result of the collaboration project Nordis (Nordic Observatory for Digital Media and Information Disorder) that you can read more about here. Representatives from Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden worked together on this investigation.

Daniel Greneaa Hansen (TjekDet)Jonathan Lundberg (Källkritikbyrån)

Joonas Pörsti (Faktabaari)

Kajsa Garmann Lønrusten (Faktisk.no)Petri Jääskeläinen (Faktabaari)

Åsa Larsson (Källkritikbyrån)

Tidigare gemensamma granskningar inom NORDIS:► Så infiltrerar ryska propagandasidor AI-chattbottar i Norden► Här är männen bakom “2-minuters hälsokontroller”► “Staten kidnappar barn” – så skiljer sig ryktena åt i de nordiska länderna

Den här granskningen är ett samarbete genom NORDIS, Nordic observatory for digital media and information disorder, ett samarbetsprojekt mellan faktagranskare och forskare i de nordiska länderna. Här hittar du artikeln på engelska på Nordis sajt!

Statistiken är tydlig: allt färre utländska läkare ansöker om att få sin utbildning prövad för arbete i Sverige.

– Jag känner en oro över att vi som land inte längre är tillräckligt attraktiva för att locka den personal som vi behöver få hit. När man lägger ihop alla åtgärder som har vidtagits skapar de en bild av Sverige som väcker frågetecken: går det att bygga en framtid i Sverige?, sade nyligen Anders Henriksson, ordförande i Sveriges kommuner och regioner (SKR) till Läkartidningen.

Det är Tidöregeringens migrationspolitik, med närmast summariska utvisningar, skärpta regler liksom reglerna för invandring av anhöriga och att det är svårare att bli svensk medborgare, som skrämmer bort de läkare som så väl behövs i den svenska sjukvården:

– Utan tvekan ser vi redan att läkare väljer bort Sverige. Tendensen går neråt, allt färre kollegor är intresserade av att komma och jobba i det svenska hälso- och sjukvårdssystemet, säger Mario González Estrada som är ordförande för Internationella läkares förening (ILF).

ILF är inte ensamma om kritiken mot den SD-ledda regeringen. Både Läkarförbundet och SKR varnar för att läkarbristen kan bli kännbar.

Socialstyrelsens statistik är tydlig: under 2025 ansökte 820 läkare om att få sin utländska utbildning granskad. Fram till och med den 19 maj i år var motsvarande siffra 277 läkare som begärde att få sin utländska utbildning granskad som ett första steg, av fem, för att kunna arbeta i Sverige.

Det är i första hand specialistläkare som saknas i den svenska vården. Sveriges Läkarförbund har analyserat behoven och kommit fram till 4400 specialistläkare i allmänmedicin behöver anställas för att täcka behoven.

Riktvärdet för hur många invånare en läkare ska ansvara för inom primärvården är 1 100. Men läkarförbundets statistik visar att snittet i landet är 1750 invånare per läkare. Och att skillnaden mellan olika regioner är stor. I Region Jämtland-Härjedalen ansvarar en läkare för 1275 invånare. I Region Västernorrland och i Region Örebro är motsvarande siffror 2309 och 2337.

Mario González Estrada frukar att antalet ansökningar om svensk läkarlegitimation kommer att fortsätta att minska:

– Det som tidigare har gjort Sverige så attraktivt för läkare har varit den stora friheten och möjligheten att kombinera arbete och familjeliv. Men nu oroar sig många för att barnen kommer att utvisas när de blir vuxna, säger han.

– Många internationella läkare är beroende av rimliga stödinsatser för att kunna försörja sig under vad som ofta är en av de mest krävande legitimationsprocesserna för läkare i Europa. För mig tog det sju år att skaffa svensk legitimation och jag skulle inte ha klarat mig utan möjligheten till föräldraledighet och bostadsbidrag, säger Mario González Estrada.

The Mandarin word for the number 250 has numerous derogatory connotations, all of which have amused Chinese speakers.

Nu är det en dryg månad kvar till sommarens höjdpunkt, Kommunisternas sommarläger i Lysestrand. För så har det blivit för mig, trots att jag inte tillhör dem som varit med sedan barnsben. Mina föräldrar var inte kommunister och hade heller inte det goda omdömet att skicka mig på Kommunisternas sommarläger.

Jag åkte på lägret för första gången sista året på det förra millenniet. Då hade jag bara varit medlem i ungdomsförbundet RKU i två månader.

Jag är inte så framfusig i nya sammanhang. Således försökte jag hålla mig lite vid sidan av. Men det gick inte. Undan för undan sögs jag in i diskussioner och samtal med andra lägerdeltagare och började känna mig alltmer hemma. För det är storheten med sommarlägret. Samvaron.

När jag som politiskt aktiv i Kommunistiska Partiet säljer Proletären eller bedriver annat utåtriktat arbete kan jag uppleva att det finns ett litet gap att ta sig över när man diskuterar med nyfikna. En del av de man talar med har en annan bild av verkligheten, mer lik den våra massmedier förmedlar.

Det är såklart rimligt. Man kan inte förvänta sig att alla man möter ska ha sett igenom massmedias skeva verklighetsbeskrivning. Men för oss som går emot medias förenklade världsbild krävs det lite jobb med att presentera alternativa förklaringar.

På sommarlägret behöver man inte göra det. Där slipper man den ständiga krigshets vi bombarderas av i SVT, Sveriges Radio eller DN, eller någon annan av alla som påstår sig förmedla nyheter.

Det blir lite av en semester från att behöva förhålla sig till makthavarnas världsbild.

Vi brukar lite högtravande säga att vi på lägret praktiserar socialism. Visst, det kan låta lite pompöst, men det ligger något i det. För vi vill alla att lägret ska fungera, så alla är beredda att ställa upp och hjälpa till med saker.

Det grundläggande är dessutom inplanerat i arbetsschemat, med ett eller två pass under veckan, lite lagom ansträngande. Fungerar allt perfekt? Nej, men vi lär oss och förbättrar allt eftersom. Tillsammans, precis som jag inbillar mig att vi kommer att göra under socialismen.

Så om du vill ha en billig semester med socialism och samvaro tycker jag att du ska kolla in Kommunisternas sommarläger. Det är inte bara till för våra medlemmar, utan för alla med hjärtat till vänster.

Det blir både semester och politik, med massor av möjligheter till diskussioner. Såväl i storgrupp efter föreläsningar, eller med vem som helst däremellan. Och det finns plats för alla, ung som gammal, hela familjer, eller den som är ensamstående. Så ta chansen och åk!

Lisa Röstlund har i Aftonbladet granskat Ulf Kristersson-kopplade Fållökna stiftelse och bland annat avslöjat stora säkerhetsbrister kring statsministern. Men civilförsvarsminister Carl-Oskar Bohlins (M) reaktion handlade inte om säkerhet – utan om reportern som skrivit artiklarna. – Han försöker svartmåla mig, säger Lisa Röstlund.

Belfast vaknade på onsdagen till förödelse efter en natt av upplopp. Protester som utlöstes av en uppmärksammad knivattack övergick i bilbränder och attacker mot bostäder.